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Since the Conquest, competition for control of natural resources between the conquerors 
and the conquered has largely shaped the fate of millions of indigenous people and thousands of 
indigenous communities across the Americas.  As Latin American nations achieved 
independence from the Spanish Empire, they began to formulate policies that would allow 
national governments and their allies to prosper from wealth taken from indigenous peoples.  
Control of resources has bought the allegiance of a majority of the nonnative populations of 
Latin American nations and given nation-states the power to repress those who disagree with or 
are disadvantaged by national development plans.  Latin American nation-states have dealt with 
indigenous peoples in a variety of ways.  While the Guatemalan state, for example, has 
formulated various attempts to exterminate indigenous communities over the decades, Panama 
has mostly attempted to encapsulate and assimilate them.  Different governing regimes have 
taken different approaches to putting these dominant strategies to work.  Since the days of the 
Torrijos regime, indigenous communities and organizations have been more directly engaged in 
negotiating their control over resource management with the state.  The current president of 
Panama, Mireya Moscoso, seems to be a master at speaking the language of indigenous rights 
and sustainable development while not doing much to empower indigenous peoples or protect 
Panama’s ecosystems against devastating overexploitation.  Nonetheless, it seems fair to note 
that under the Moscoso regime, indigenous communities do not seem as disadvantaged as they 
might be if a president less interested in rendering lip-service to indigenous rights were at the 
helm. 
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How have indigenous societies responded to the changes taking place around them as 
development proceeds, and how have they been able to retain or regain control over resource 
management and their own forms of development?  This article examines the experiences of the 
Kunas and the Ngöbe1 of Panama as they attempt to survive and adapt to development imposed 
by a dominant society.  These indigenous societies have adapted to different ecological settings 
on the small isthmus, have been faced with different kinds of challenges to their control of lands 
and resources, and have responded in different ways.  The first section contains descriptions of 
the challenges facing the two groups and an overview of important development and indigenous 
policies in Panama that have shaped the conditions to which indigenous societies must continue 
to formulate responses.  The second section is a summary and analysis of the indigenous 
societies’ responses to attempts by outsiders to expropriate their lands and resources.   
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND DEVELOPMENT IN PANAMA 
In the sociopolitical systems in which they are now encapsulated, indigenous 
communities rarely have opportunities to participate in negotiating the terms of development on 
lands they have occupied for generations.  Ecological conservation and development programs 
that might help rural communities meet their own changing needs have not been lasting priorities 
of national development in Panama.  Instead, for the governing elite development means 
cooperation with foreign governments and transnational business interests that support the 
Panamanian state in exchange for government cooperation with international development 
schemes.  Development driven by the world capitalist system has failed to address the needs of 
Panama’s poor majority.  A distribution of land, technical services, and capital that equates 
development with commodities extraction benefits multinational corporations and a small 
Panamanian elite class and has pushed subsistence farmers onto increasingly smaller and lower-
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quality plots of land in rural Panama.  In combination with population growth, this kind of 
socioeconomic asymmetry, established and maintained through politics since colonial times, has 
created the ecological problem of land degradation.   
Given these circumstances, the pursuit of traditional2 social and economic activities has 
become decreasingly viable, and indigenous cultural survival is threatened.  Maintaining or 
constructing ecologically sustainable resource management regimes has been difficult or 
impossible for indigenous societies.  As populations grow and their land bases shrink, fallow 
cycles are shortened despite traditions and best ecological judgments, timber and other natural 
resources are harvested unsustainably, and outsiders promise benefits in exchange for access to 
lands and resource bases that are then degraded or destroyed.  Promised benefits also, in many 
cases, fail to materialize.   
DEVELOPMENT AND INDIGENOUS POLICIES IN PANAMA 
Early legislation regarding indigenous populations in Panama called for their conversion to 
civilized life.  The means specified included the transfer of Indian lands to nonindigenous settlers 
and the promotion of state-sanctioned agriculture on former indigenous lands (cf. Guionneau-
Sinclair 1991; Howe 1998).  Each successive Panamanian constitution, from the 1904 version to 
the 1972 constitution that currently governs the country, has established the government’s right to 
govern indigenous lands.  Lands recognized by the government as occupied by indigenous peoples 
have been referred to as reservas3 or comarcas.  4  Comarca lands are inalienable and 
imprescriptible5 and cannot be attached (Herrera 1998).  The resources on them, however, are 
granted to indigenous peoples only via usufruct, and the state maintains its right to exploit all such 
resources.   
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Under Omar Torrijos’s populist regime, the Panamanian state began to engage traditionally 
disenfranchised groups, including indigenous peoples, in political participation.  The 1972 
constitution establishes provisions that recognize indigenous leaders and facilitate the election of 
indigenous representatives to the legislature.  It also addresses indigenous languages and identity 
and bilingual education for indigenous children and recognizes indigenous agrarian and collective 
land-holding practices (Guionneau-Sinclair, 1991).  In addition, the state guarantees indigenous 
communities rights to lands and to hold property collectively (Gjording, 1991; Golchér, 1998b).   
Despite these constitutional guarantees, crucial gaps in indigenous rights remain.  One is 
the above-mentioned right reserved to the government of ownership and development of natural 
resources on comarca lands.  This permits the government to authorize or pursue large-scale 
development projects on indigenous lands and prevents substantive indigenous control of lands 
and resources.  Nonindigenous people’s private property rights and economic development 
projects within indigenous comarcas have been given special protections by law, and enforcement 
of policies that ostensibly protect indigenous societies has been lax or absent.  Protection of 
indigenous peoples’ rights has been, at best, secondary to the pursuit of socioeconomic 
development and the protection of the interests of more powerful actors on both domestic and 
international political and economic fronts.   
Rights concerning development and natural resources vis-à-vis indigenous peoples whose 
lands are protected by comarca status are now clearly delineated in several articles of Law 41, the 
General Environmental Law passed by the Panamanian legislature in July 1998 (Asamblea 
Legislativa, 1998).  The law offers indigenous peoples and comarcal ecosystems explicit 
protections, guaranteeing their rights to control and develop lands and resources, engage in 
autonomous development, and retain profits from development carried out by others within the 
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comarca..  This and other recent legislation recognizes indigenous authorities as part of the 
national system, accords respect to indigenous cultures as part of the nation’s history, and 
acknowledges the necessity of consulting indigenous communities when development decisions 
affect them (Herrera, 1998).  If such legislation were to be enforced, indigenous communities 
might benefit tremendously.  Seventy-five percent of the mining concessions in Panama, for 
example, are on indigenous and forest lands (Elton, 1997).  It has yet to be fully implemented, 
however, and the capacity of the Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (National Environmental 
Authority—ANAM6) to implement and enforce it is in doubt.   
The indeterminate nature and lack of enforcement of state policies regarding sustainable 
development and indigenous peoples, as well as the driving goals of national and international 
development, have facilitated the exploitation of indigenous lands and resources and the transfer of 
most associated wealth to nonindigenous people.  Today, according to a World Bank study, 95 
percent of the country’s indigenous areas are impoverished and 86 percent of the country’s 
indigenous people live beneath the extreme poverty mark (Chéry, 2000).  The Moscoso 
administration, elected in 1999, has promised to address this problem.  Although the 
administration’s announced goals regarding development in indigenous areas are rather nebulous7, 
their articulation may indicate that a reorientation of development and indigenous policies is under 
way.  The question remains, however, whether the new administration will be able to redirect 
development priorities in such a way as to protect indigenous peoples’ rights to manage resources.  
Indigenous lands and resources represent the “final frontier” available for development, as other 
lands and resources have already been exploited and, in most cases, exhausted (cf. Elton, 1997).    
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THE KUNAS 
The Kunas, who call themselves the Tule8 people, originated in the Colombian Darién 
and were an established ethnic group in the western Darién, in what is today inland eastern 
Panama, by the late 1500s or early 1600s (Wali, 1989; 1993).  Incursions by other groups forced 
some Kunas to move to even more remote lands (Barry and Lindsay-Poland, 1995; Wali, 1989), 
and by the mid-1800s the majority of them had migrated to the San Blas Islands off Panama’s 
Caribbean coast (Ventocilla et al., 1996; Wali, 1993).  The Kunas of Kuna Yala9 are descendants 
of these migrants (Ventocilla, Herrera, and Nuñez 1995, 10).  The Madungandí Kunas remained 
inland but have maintained ties with Kuna Yala through trade and intermarriage (Wali, 1993).10 
In traditional times, Kuna communities in Kuna Yala and Madungandí owned, controlled, 
and managed lands and productive endeavors communally, and “any issue of consequence was 
decided collectively, usually after hours of debate” (Howe, 1998: 17).  Nightly singing 
gatherings (congresos) have traditionally been the cement of Kuna political culture.11  The 
meetings consist of storytelling (especially recounting of the origin myths that convey important 
information crucial to ecologically sustainable agriculture, fishing, and hunting), ritual chanting, 
and consensus-based decision making (Wali, 1989).  In traditional times, all members of Kuna 
communities were expected to attend.  Ordinay and ceremonial life fostered the creation and 
maintenance of a strong sense of community in each village and between villages.  Intervillage 
relations reinforced across generations by ritual obligations provided the basis for what would 
later become more complex and formalized regional structures (Howe, 1986) as Kuna 
communities adapted to changing socioeconomic and political conditions in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s (see Howe, 1998).   
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Regional political structures evolved as contacts with outsiders intensified and increasing 
integration into Colombia and later Panama resulted in both challenges to and opportunities for 
political development.  Kuna political organization continued to be underpinned by frequent 
gatherings, rules and taboos enforced by police, and the cooperative productive activities 
required to sustain farming, hunting, and gathering and to hold out against other settlers who 
sought to occupy their lands (cf. Howe, 1986).12  Their rapidly evolving political cultures 
enabled the Kuna societies to adapt to changing political circumstances and to pass along 
traditional indigenous knowledge at the same time as they adopted knowledge and skills from the 
outside under the guidance of leaders and elders.  By 1925 the Kunas had consolidated 
associational autonomy—the ability to organize in defense of collective interests without 
attracting intervention or punishment by more powerful social and political actors (Fox, 1997).  
Since then, the two Kuna societies have typically acted as associations to pursue their common 
goals as interaction with dominant socioeconomic and political systems has intensified.  Kuna 
organization, aggression, and initiative in negotiating land claims with the Panamanian state 
resulted in the legal demarcation of their lands as indigenous territories before the middle of the 
twentieth century.   
Traditional Kuna institutions persist today as defining characteristics of society in Kuna 
Yala and among the Madungandí Kunas.  Many problems are still solved through traditional 
institutional mechanisms such as chiefly leadership and intervillage government.  These 
institutions have been underpinned by newer Kuna institutions such as the general congresses, in 
which communities regularly come together to discuss threats and find solutions to their 
problems.   
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Today Kuna Yala is both a province and a comarca.  It consists of approximately 320,000 
hectares (or 736,000 acres)13 (Ventocilla et al., 1996) of island (where people live) and 
coastlands (where they farm).  Preliminary 2000 Panamanian National Census data indicate that 
the current population of Kuna Yala is 32,411 (Contraloría General de la República de Panamá, 
2000).   
Lands occupied by the Kunas of Kuna Yala have not yet been subjected to extensive 
nonindigenous development, partly because the Kunas have (until recent years) reacted 
forcefully and cooperatively to attempts by outsiders to expropriate their lands and resources and 
partly because those lands and resources have never been incorporated into Panama’s national 
development agenda.  The successful Tule Revolution of 1925 (see Howe, 1998) was the means 
by which the Kunas avoided assimilation. Nonetheless, Kuna Yala is today faced with the 
degradation of resources (most notably sea turtle and lobster populations) and the breakdown of 
traditional culture as resource bases are mortgaged to facilitate participation in outside 
economies.  Developers are also becoming increasingly interested in timber and mineral 
resources on lands held by the Kunas and are seeking political routes by which they might 
exploit them (Chapin, 1991; 1994; Howe, 1998; Ventocilla, Herrera, and Nuñez, 1995; 
Ventocilla et al., 1996).   
About 3,000 Madungandí Kunas live in inland eastern Panama (ORKUM, n.d.; 
Ventocilla, Herrera, and Nuñez, 1995) where since the mid-1960s nonindigenous development 
has been intensive but not comprehensive or sustained.  Like their relatives in Kuna Yala, they 
initially coordinated effective political responses to outsiders’ attempts to expropriate their lands 
and resources.  When their lands were targeted for transformation into a backwater behind the 
Ascanio Villalaz Hydroelectric Dam by an aggressive national plan to provide power to Panama 
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City, however, they were unable to formulate a timely and coherent political response.  They lost 
80 percent of their reserve in the mid-1970s.  Over the next 20 years, the Madungandí Kunas 
refined their political skills as they sought new lands and other compensation from successive 
Panamanian regimes.  Meanwhile, they survived as a society and occupied and used other lands 
in the vicinity not used by other settler groups or subjected to state-sponsored development.  The 
Madungandí Kunas’ new comarca, recognized in 1996, is made up of 180,000 hectares of land 
(or 414,000 acres) surrounding the Bayano reservoir (ORKUM, n.d.).14   
THE NGÖBE 
The Ngöbe were driven by the arrival of Europeans and warfare among indigenous 
peoples during the sixteenth century into remote mixed deciduous-tropical forests in 
mountainous regions of western Panama, where local ecosystems could not sustain large 
populations engaged in swidden agriculture (Barry and Lindsay-Poland, 1995; Young, 1985).  
The historical record suggests that the poor quality of the mountainous soils and avoidance of 
conquest by outsiders required high mobility and facilitated the dispersion of Ngöbe kin-group-
based residential units, or caseríos (Young, 1971).  These conditions produced a relatively 
segmentary and acephalous political culture.  Most decision making took place at the level of the 
caseríos.  Caseríos were linked to one another by kinship and ritual ties but not by formal 
political associations (Young, 1971).  Young and Bort suggest that "this segmentary arrangement 
served to dissipate and render largely ineffective any external attempts to control [Ngöbe] 
affairs," since groups could split apart or form new alliances as circumstances required (1979: 
79, 81).  Kinship ties between caseríos and rituals in which large numbers of Ngöbe participated 
helped maintain the cooperation and mutual aid necessary to support the subsistence economy in 
times of low agricultural productivity (Young and Bort, 1979).  For at least 300 years this 
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political culture allowed the Ngöbe to live together and cooperate while avoiding conquest and to 
remain engaged in productive activities that provided subsistence security while protecting 
ecological resources for future generations.   
External processes forced a transformation of Ngöbe productive activities and social 
relations between the 1930s and the 1960s (Young, 1971).  By the end of this period, they were 
rapidly losing access to lands and resources and facing serious threats to their cultural survival.  
Previously successful adaptations to the arrival of Europeans to the isthmus, their traditional 
power structures, and their means of subsistence had been undermined by the steady 
encroachment of outsiders, internal demographic changes, ecological pressures, and external 
actors’ attempts to integrate the Ngöbe into economic and political systems (Young and Bort, 
1979).  By the 1960s only about half of the lands available to the Ngöbe were arable (Young, 
1971), and their population was growing steadily.   
By 1990 the average population density on Ngöbe lands was nearly 17 per square 
kilometer (Young and Bort, 1999), a density that is considered unsustainable for swidden 
agriculturists in the tropics.  Preliminary 2000 Panamanian National Census data indicate that the 
total population of the Ngöbe-Buglé comarca is 110,619 (Contraloría General de la República de 
Panamá, 2000).15  The Ngöbe-Buglé peoples have recognized comarca status for approximately 
650,000 hectares (or 1,495,000 acres), about half of their traditional territory (Young and Bort, 
1999).  Overexploitation of the remaining agricultural lands means that fewer and fewer Ngöbe 
can engage in agriculture.  Fallow periods are too short, and Ngöbe crop yields are noticeably 
reduced on degraded soils (Philip D. Young, interview, May 11, 1998).  Attempts to earn cash 
income by raising cattle have further undermined ecological well-being and exacerbated 
shortages of arable land.  Ngöbe men have increasingly engaged in wage labor as temporary 
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workers in the agroindustrial sector.  Seeking wages is an individual pursuit that has weakened 
both communal agricultural practices, based on reciprocal exchanges of goods and labor, and 
kinship networks (Young and Bort, 1999). 
Although the Ngöbe have made significant progress in organizing a modern political 
system and receiving legal recognition for some of their homelands, serious obstacles to 
establishing effective organization and lasting associational autonomy remain.  Since the creation 
of the Ngöbe-Buglé comarca, the indigenous leadership has been in disagreement about who is 
to head the comarcal government, and their intense political wrangling has kept them from 
forming a government that might comprehensively address development concerns.  At the same 
time, traditional leaders are being excluded from the recognized contemporary political structure 
(Herrera, 1998).  As integration with the Panamanian economy and society has increased, the 
loyalties of the Ngöbe people have been divided.  Outsider “patrons” interested in Ngöbe 
resources typically target the poorest among the Ngöbe as clients (cf. Machuca, 2000; Young, 
1985), and, while many indigenous communities have received international funding for 
development, it has been on a largely piecemeal basis that has fostered neither cohesion nor 
sustained investment in Ngöbe communities (John R. Bort, personal communication, August 29, 
2000).   
In the early 1970s, Ngöbe lands became the focus of intense national and multinational 
interest when abundant copper deposits were discovered under Cerro Colorado.  The area was 
surveyed, project plans were drawn up, a road was built to the Cerro Colorado site, and engineers 
began to drill and dig test pits as they explored the area (Young, 1985).  Intent upon securing the 
revenues that could come from mining, the government moved ahead with granting mining 
concessions on Ngöbe lands.  Neither the Panamanian government nor the companies interested 
 12 
in establishing a mine at Cerro Colorado consulted with the Ngöbe before beginning work in the 
area.  In 1981 plans were suspended when Rio Tinto Zinc, the multinational corporate partner of 
the state mining corporation, Corporación de Desarrollo Minero Cerro Colorado (Cerro Colorado 
Mining Development Corporation—CODEMIN), determined that the venture would be 
unprofitable because of the low price of copper on the global market.  In the mid-1990s the 
Panamanian Legislative Assembly granted a concession to Empresa Panacobre, S.A., a 
subsidiary of the Canadian mining company registered as Tiomin Resources, Inc., that would 
allow it to exploit the Cerro Colorado copper deposit (Mitchell, 1996; Young and Bort, 1999), 
but the concession has not yet been put to use (Young and Bort, 1999).   
Developers are also interested in the possibility of harnessing the hydroelectric energy that 
could be generated by the Tabasará River.  Three powerful Panamanian businessmen (one a former 
vice president of Panama), doing business since 1999 as the Consorcio Hidroeléctrico Tabasará, 
S.A. (Tabasará Hydroelectric Consortium), have been receiving government support for their plans 
to build two dams on the river, at least one of which is certainly within the boundaries of the 
Ngöbe-Buglé comarca.  In April 1999 the consortium requested a concession for construction and 
exploitation of electricity-generating facilities on the Tabasará from the Ente Regulador de los 
Servicios Públicos (Regulatory Entity of Public Services—ERSP) (Abrego, 2000).  ANAM, in an 
official communiqué to ERSP, agreed that the waters of the Tabasará River were suitable for use in 
generating hydroelectric power (Abrego, 2000).   
The consortium claims that the phase 2 area of the Tabasará hydroelectric project is 
entirely outside the comarca.  The Ngöbe claim that the area is within the comarca as specified by 
Article 12 of Law 10 of 1997, which established its boundaries (Young and Wickstrom, 2000).  It 
is estimated that approximately 514 hectares of land will be inundated by the project, and, while 
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insisting that the affected areas are outside the comarca, a consortium representative has suggested 
that the inundation may affect about 50 Ngöbe families and 12 farms.  Comarca leaders believe 
that some 2,000 hectares of land will be inundated (Madrid and Vásquez, 2000) and more than 
2,000 Ngöbe families will be affected (Abrego, 2000).  Although ANAM initially approved the 
consortium’s environmental impact essessment (EIA) for phase 2, the leader of the Ngöbe-Buglé 
comarca, Camilo Ortega, maintains that no one from ANAM visited the affected areas or consulted 
with affected Ngöbe people or the Ngöbe-Buglé leadership (Abrego, 2000).  The Panamanian 
Supreme Court has suspended the ANAM resolution approving the EIA for phases 1 and 2 (Philip 
D. Young, personal communication, July 29, 2002; Rodríguez B., 2002), but no formal 
determination has been made that would definitively render the project canceled.   
INDIGENOUS MOBILIZATION AND STRATEGIC POLITICAL RESPONSES 
THE KUNAS 
By migrating and rebelling, the Kunas defeated initial attempts by Colombia and then 
Panama to conquer or assimilate them.  They have maintained de facto (though not de jure)16 
control over Kuna Yala as a sovereign state within Panama.  Many Kunas attribute this to the 
government’s fear that the Kunas will rebel again as they did in 1925 (Eyra Harbar, Hector 
Huerta, and Aresio Valiente López, interview, Panama City, 1998; Atencio López, interview, 
September 4, 1998).  While some might contend that the Panamanian state allows the Kunas 
cultural autonomy because it has successfully encapsulated them and is gradually integrating 
their resources into the national development plan (see Adams, 1991), this characterization 
ignores the important part played by the Kunas in shaping their autonomy and control over 
resources.  Although developers and Panamanian governments have pursued clientelistic 
relations with the Kunas, high levels of associational autonomy in traditional Kuna political 
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culture have for the most part prevented clientelism from undermining Kuna society.  As contact 
with outside cultures has increased, the Kunas have implemented a variety of measures for 
preserving autonomy.  With their coastal location and years of trade with other peoples, they 
have become skillful diplomats, negotiating formal agreements, playing potential rivals against 
one another, and employing spies (see Howe, 1998).  The Kunas have studied the belief systems, 
behaviors, and institutions of other peoples, but outsiders have not been permitted to settle or 
own property in Kuna Yala (Ventocilla et al., 1996).  Debt has been assiduously avoided (Howe, 
1998).  After the 1925 Tule Revolution, Kuna leaders formalized a system of regional 
governance and drew up terms by which their comarca would be administered (Howe, 1986).  A 
unified political system was established, directed by a Kuna General Congress that meets three 
times a year.  Panamanian legislation passed in 1953 confirmed this system (Howe, 1998).  
While the state maintains its right to exploit all their natural resources, the Kunas believe that a 
“divine land-grant” to their territory invalidates all other claims (Howe, 1986).   
As Kuna political culture evolves, Kuna organizations appear to be playing a stronger 
role in uniting the Kunas around common goals and enabling them to solve problems.  There are 
approximately 30 Kuna organizations that promote sustainable development and autonomous 
control of resources and address issues of cultural survival (Herrera, 1998).  The Kuna General 
Congress has created and sponsored organizations that are working to preserve indigenous 
culture and protect Kuna rights to lands and resources (cf. Brathwaite, 2000).  The Instituto de 
Desarrollo Integral de Kuna Yala (Development Institute of Kuna Yala—IDIKY), for example, 
is a planning organization that implements, coordinates, and directs development within the 
comarca (Ventocilla et al., 1996), including the work of other Kuna NGOs (Tat Neba Nelson de 
Young, interview, September 7, 1998).  Other important Kuna organizations include the 
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Proyecto de Estudio para el Manejo de Areas Silvestres de Kuna Yala (Study Project for the 
Management of the Wildlands of Kuna Yala—PEMASKY) (see Chapin, 1985; ten Kate, 1995; 
Ventocilla et al., 1996) and the Asociación Napguana, which provides financial, organizational, 
and legal assistance to community-level development projects (Asociación Napguana, n.d. 
[1998?]; Tat Neba Nelson de Young, inteview, September 7, 1998). 
Kuna communities have formed cooperatives to assist one another in agricultural and 
economic endeavors.  Mujeres Trabajadores de Nakeudiryai (Women Workers of Nakeudiryai) 
is one example.  This group of about 46 women works to provide for their families’ subsistence 
needs and to feed other members of the Río Tigre community.  With assistance from Asociación 
Napguana, the Panamanian Office of the First Lady, and Panama’s Ministry of Agricultural and 
Livestock Development, the women manage a livestock breeding and distribution project and 
collaborate in farming bananas, plantains, yucca, otoe, corn and other vegetables (Etigenia 
Martínez, inteview, September 11, 1998).    
Kuna organizations pursue a variety of sophisticated strategies to promote autonomous and 
ecologically sustainable development.  Organizations such as Mujeres Trabajadores de 
Nakeudiryai and PEMASKY have established relations with Panamanian government agencies 
that provide aid for particular projects.  The Kunas have also formed panindigenous alliances in 
Panama and internationally.  In addition, Kuna activists and lawyers are promoting autonomy by 
training communities and Kuna organizations to formulate and pursue legal strategies (Eyra 
Harbar, Hector Huerta, and Aresio Valiente López, interview, September 8, 1998).  Perhaps most 
important, Kuna organizations have established relationships with Panamanian and international 
NGOs promoting indigenous land rights, environmental protection, and protection of indigenous 
knowledge.  PEMASKY and the Centro de Asistencia Legal Popular (Center for Popular Legal 
 16 
Assistance), for example, have worked with the World Conservation Union17 to develop policies 
that minimize environmental destruction by more effectively regulating problematic activities, 
enhancing the conservation and regulatory capacities of existing Kuna organizations, and 
improving environmental education (El Panamá América, 1998).  Representatives of Asociación 
Napguana and other Kuna organizations have played active roles in attempting to establish global 
standards for ecologically sustainable development and the ethical treatment of indigenous peoples 
and in pushing for indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination and autonomous control of 
lands and resources (cf. Asociación Napguana, n.d. [1998?]). The Kunas also use international 
communications networks and alliances with human rights and environmental NGOs to publicize 
attempts by outsiders to expropriate resources (see Project Underground, 1996).   
In addition to organizational capacity and strategic competence,18 the legal savvy attained 
by individual Kunas who have completed legal education in Panama and elsewhere has enabled 
the Kunas to expand their repertoire of legal options.  The Madungandí Kunas (along with two 
Emberá communities), for example, have recently filed suit against the Panamanian government in 
the Organization of American States’s Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for 
compensation for damages arising from unkept agreements made during the construction of the 
Ascanio Villalaz Hydroelectric Dam and for ecological damage caused by the dam (NativeWeb, 
2001).   
Aggression is still a useful tool in the Kunas’ political arsenal.  The Kunas have established 
a strong reputation for exerting sovereign control over all development within Kuna Yala.  They 
regularly reiterate that all development in Kuna Yala must be approved by the Kuna General 
Congress and assert that mining exploration by outsiders within the comarca will not be permitted, 
regardless of whether the state claims ownership of subsurface minerals or whether mining 
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interests have secured permission from the state (Atencio López, interview, September 4, 1998).  
In addition to gearing up to confront the government about indigenous rights and mining, the 
Kunas have threatened would-be miners themselves.  In 1996, for example, the Kuna General 
Congress issued an order for the detention of the president of a mining company that held 
exploratory mining concessions in Kuna Yala (El Panamá América, 1996).   
Despite their having effectively rebuffed most outsiders’ attempts to control their lands and 
resources, the Kunas’ cultural identity and the survival of traditional belief systems are at risk.  
Their contemporary means of amassing and exerting power appear to be less effective than 
traditional ones at sustaining these aspects of Kuna culture.  The most significant contemporary 
threats to cultural survival and local resource bases appear to be rooted in the increasing 
acceptance of external socioeconomic and cultural norms by today’s youthful generations and 
overexploitation of Kuna Yala’s plant and animal resources as individual cash incomes have 
become increasingly important.  Cooperative productive activities are frequently undermined by 
individual participation in outside wage labor and markets.  These problems are tied to the 
disintegration of traditional authority and to the subjugation of traditional productive activities and 
knowledge to other kinds of economic activities and knowledge.  Kuna leaders no longer exercise 
substantial control over their people’s political and economic behavior.  Traditional rules and 
taboos are no longer as strictly enforced.  Although all members of the community are still 
expected to attend the nightly gatherings, for example, not all do so (cf. Chapin, 1991; Chapin, 
1994).   
THE NGÖBE 
The Ngöbe’s segmentary, acephalous political culture and consensus-based decision-
making practices have placed them at a relative disadvantage in resisting subjugation by dominant 
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forces and managing local natural resources sustainably in a quickly changing profit-oriented 
socioeconomic environment.  Because their traditional political culture had few mechanisms for 
coordinated, societywide decision making or leadership, their responses to rapid socioeconomic 
and political change brought by modernization and the encroachment of the dominant Panamanian 
society were largely uncoordinated until the 1980s.  Since then they have been struggling to define 
their own ethnic identity and contemporary social and political systems, and to survive 
economically on their much-reduced land base.   
The Mama Chi revitalization movement of the early 1960s was the first collective response 
to the gradual erosion of the Ngöbe subsistence base and the exacerbation of the economic crisis 
that accompanied mechanization of nearby banana plantations on which Ngöbe men depended for 
wage labor.  According to Young and Bort (1999: 116-117), 
By initially seeking as much withdrawal from contact with the Panamanian world as could be 
achieved, the teachings of Mama Chi addressed the fundamental nature of the relationships of 
subordination and dependency that existed between the Ngóbe and the outside world.  By 
prohibiting the performance of certain traditional rituals and banning the consumption of alcohol 
(which was an integral part of the rituals), and by vigorously promoting, through prayers and new 
rituals, the idea of pan-Ngóbe sister- and brotherhood, the movement served to restructure the very 
foundations of Ngóbe culture as the Ngóbe themselves understood it. 
The movement allowed a substantial portion of Ngöbe society to transcend kinship-based 
organizational patterns and come to see themselves as members of a larger Ngöbe society 
(Young, 1985).  As it was transformed from a religious to a political response to increasing 
economic hardship, it marked "the beginning of a process of politicization among the Ngóbe” 
(Young and Bort, 1999: 117).  The construction of a new identity and a more cohesive political 
culture that began with the movement continues, and the Mama Chis are reportedly some of the 
best-organized Ngöbe today (Blas Quintero Sánchez, interview, September 9, 1998).   
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In the early 1970s, the Torrijos regime made attempts to engage the Ngöbe in national 
politics.  Torrijos hoped that extending political representation to the Ngöbe would guarantee the 
support of indigenous leaders and their supposed constituent communities for his regime, its 
development program, and—in particular—exploitation of copper deposits on Ngöbe lands.  He 
promised Ngöbe leaders that support for the mining project at Cerro Colorado would result in the 
establishment of comarca status for Ngöbe territory.  His regime recognized the political 
authority of three provincial-level indigenous caciques and their designated local-level 
representatives.  It also recognized indigenous gatherings organized by the caciques19 as 
instruments of internal decision making.  In voting districts occupied by Ngöbe, a number of 
Ngöbe representatives were elected to newly created positions in the national legislature (see 
Gjording, 1991; Young and Bort, 1979).   
Despite these changes, the Ngöbe were unable to take collective advantage of openings 
for political participation at the national level.  New openings for political participation initially 
produced competition among the emerging Ngöbe power seekers (Young and Bort, 1979).  
Because decision making had previously taken place at the level of the autonomous caseríos, 
emerging power seekers could not legitimately claim to represent the “Ngöbe people.”  Having 
no real experience with formal political organizations, Ngöbe political leaders, even when 
supported by their own communities, were generally ill-equipped to represent them.  By the mid-
1970s many Ngöbe were still unclear about what provincial caciques might do, who they were, 
and how they were chosen.  The new leaders were also unable to present a united front to 
outsiders (Young and Bort, 1979).  Such problems persist.   
Nevertheless, the Ngöbe have been gradually becoming more capable of using existing 
political institutions to their advantage.  Concern over land rights “is the one issue on which most 
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[Ngöbe] agree” (Young, 1985: 8), and threats to local ecology and autonomy posed by mining 
development have pushed the Ngöbe to develop more strategic competence.     
The first instance of conflict over the mining operation at Cerro Colorado took place in 
1978 in a Ngöbe community called Suitche in the province of Bocas del Toro (Gjording, 1991: 
178).  Negotiations between CODEMIN and the regional cacique José Mónico Cruz and other 
local leaders began after members of the community destroyed equipment that hydrologists were 
using at a nearby river.  Local leaders, with support from Jesuit priests, began to try to organize 
the Ngöbe in resistance to the Cerro Colorado project and the Teribe-Changuinola hydroelectric 
dam and to press the government for recognition of a Ngöbe comarca.  By 1980 the Ngöbe had 
resolved to oppose mining on Ngöbe lands and to oppose the national government if it continued 
to promote mining and to deny them comarca status for their lands (Gjording, 1991).20  The 
Ngöbe demanded legal recognition of a comarca before they would consider granting approval 
of the mining project on their lands (Young and Bort, 1999: 122).   
The Ngöbe began to develop more strategic competence by attempting to "restructure 
their political organization and make the new system function effectively" (Young and Bort, 
1999: 121).  Ngöbe political leaders, including caciques, their local representatives, and 
representatives to the Panamanian National Assembly, organized meetings that they hoped 
would engage the entire Ngöbe community in resistance politics and the demand for a comarca 
(Gjording, 1991).  Organizational assistance from the Mama Chis and the Catholic Church and 
help from nonindigenous peasants were supplemented by experience gained by Ngöbe activists 
when they joined with the Kunas and Chocó in a national panindigenous organization in the 
1970s (Gjording, 1991; Young and Bort, 1999).  Ngöbe leaders also began to receive technical 
guidance from an NGO in Panama City, the Centro de Estudios y Acción Social-Panamá (Center 
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for Studies and Social Action-Panama—CEASPA) (Young and Bort, 1999).  In addition, 
Western-educated Ngöbe who lived in Panama City helped the Ngöbe organize.  During this 
period of resistance and relative solidarity among the Ngöbe (1980-1997), many Ngöbe, 
including women, began to engage in political action that went well beyond the bounds of 
traditional culture.  Ngöbe also appealed to organizations such as the United Nations 
Development Programme, the International Labour Organization, the Coordinadora Nacional de 
los Pueblos Indígenas de Panamá (National Coordinating Committee of the Indigenous Peoples 
of Panama—CONAPIP), and even the Spanish government for assistance in stopping mining at 
Cerro Colorado and gaining comarca status for their lands (Franceschi R., 1997; Montezuma, 
1996; Montezuma et al., 1996).  Ngöbe activists sought assistance in publicizing their struggles 
internationally from the Rainforest Alliance in Costa Rica (Tropical Conservation Newsbureau, 
1996), the South and Meso American Indian Rights Center in Oakland, California (South and 
Meso American Indian Rights Center, 1996), and Project Underground in Berkeley, California 
(Ngöbe-Bugle, 1997).   
In 1995 a group of Ngöbe protesters was arrested and incarcerated for protesting mining 
activities in Veraguas.  Because publicity about this incident threatened to devalue the stock of 
the mining company Geo Tec, President Ernesto Pérez Balladares met with Ngöbe leaders and 
created an intergovernmental commission between the Panamanian executive branch and the 
Ngöbe leadership to negotiate the demarcation of comarca boundaries (Quintero Sánchez, 1998).  
In 1996 a group of more than 300 Ngöbe activists marched 440 km from Chiriquí to the 
Panamanian capital to demand the creation of a Ngöbe-Buglé comarca and an end to mining 
activities in their aboriginal territories.  After arriving in Panama City and seeking an audience 
with national leaders, the protesters embarked on a hunger strike, issued a number of press 
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releases, and protested for several days (Golchér, 1998a).  The march and protest brought intense 
national attention to their concerns.   
In January 1997 the Panamanian National Assembly granted the Ngöbe-Buglé peoples 
comarca status for about half of what they were claiming as their traditional homelands.21  In 
March 1997 President Pérez Balladares signed Law 10, which sets forth the terms by which the 
comarca is established and is to be governed (Young and Bort, 1999: 127-128).  Article 28 of the 
law specifies that the government retains the rights to develop all natural resources within the 
comarca in accordance with development plans and policies that benefit the nation (Asamblea 
Legislativa, 1997: 14).  While their draft charter (carta orgánica)22 explicitly recognizes 
collective land-holding privileges, it also guarantees protection to private property holders whose 
lands are within the boundaries of the new comarca (Comisión del Anteproyecto de Carta 
Orgánica, 1998: 8-9).  Although the national government recognizes the authority of the 
comarcal government, it restricts the responsibilities of comarcal governmental authorities and 
leaders to establishing internal “norms” and expressing the ethnic and cultural identity of the 
Ngöbe-Buglé peoples (1998: 11).  Furthermore, the primary delineated responsibility of the 
Ngöbe-Buglé cacique general is to “respect and enforce respect for the laws of the Republic” 
(1998: 18).  Finally, while the draft charter specifies that the Ngöbe-Buglé people are to be 
involved in the development of natural resources on the comarca and the enjoyment of profits 
derived from such development, the rest of the sections on development and natural resources 
contain few specific indications of how such involvement is to be facilitated.  Instead, these 
sections are largely devoted to delineating the authority and responsibilities of national 
government entities in managing development and natural resources (1998: 27-30).  The final 
charter, ratified by the Panamanian government and comarcal authorities on August 30, 1999, 
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specifies that all plans and projects carried out within the comarca must be approved and 
coordinated by traditional and “official” (presumably Panamanian governmental) authorities 
(Bocharel and Cádiz F., 1999).   
In spite of explicit provisions, indigenous authorities were not consulted, and neither 
existing laws nor comarcal boundaries were respected as initial plans for the Tabasará 
hydroelectric project were set in motion.  Since April 1999, when the consortium requested 
concessions to begin construction of the project, the Ngöbe and their legal representatives have 
been collecting information about the project and protesting.  Ngöbe leaders continue to insist 
they will not allow the project to be imposed on their lands and communities.  Camilo Ortega has 
announced, “If blood has to flow, it will flow” (Madrid and Vásquez, 2000).  The Ngöbe have 
organized alongside nonindigenous peasants concerned about the project’s impacts (Abrego, 
2000; Bocharel, 2000b).  Both Ngöbe and peasant protesters have created organizations of their 
own, and they have cooperated to create a single organization to oppose the project, the 10th of 
April Peasants’ and Indigenous People’s Movement.  Ngöbe leaders are also working with 
attorneys (Sánchez Beliste, 2001) and participating with national organizations that research and 
promote indigenous land and resource rights, such as CONAPIP (Bernal, 1997) and the 
Asociación Indígena Panameña (Panamanian Indigenous Association) (Franciso A. Herrera, 
interview, August 21, 1998).  They have also solicited the support of international NGOs 
(Herrera, 1998) and have threatened to file suit against the Panamanian government in the 
Organization of American States’s Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Rodríguez 
B., 2002).  These efforts have brought about at least a temporary suspension of the project. 
During the Pérez Balladares presidency and in the early days of the Moscoso 
administration, the consortium and its international investment partners had more room to hope 
 24 
that construction on the Tabasará hydroelectric project could proceed without considering 
protections for local ecology or indigenous rights.  Since 2000, however, the Ngöbe appear to be 
gaining more support from national-level Panamanian authorities.  Comarcal authorities met with 
Panama’s ombudsman in May 2000 to denounce the project.  Having listened to their concerns, the 
ombudsman agreed that they were legitimate, that Ngöbe rights needed better protection, and that 
the Ngöbe had to be included in the decision-making process (Bocharel, 2000b).  A National 
Assembly representative from Chiriquí recently clarified that the project will inundate 13 percent 
of the comarca and claimed that the EIA for phase 2 contained irregularities and had to be 
reconsidered.  He also claimed that a study of the project by the ombudsman’s office failed to give 
adequate consideration to ecological impacts and measures that the consortium might take to 
mitigate them.  He suggested that the Legislative Assembly’s Commission on Indigenous Affairs 
hire an engineer to conduct an independent evaluation of the project and recommend ways to keep 
its implementation within its legal boundaries (Bocharel, 2000a).  Most recently, the president of 
the Legislative Assembly has instructed the president of its Commission on Indigenous Affairs to 
form a subcommittee on the project that includes all interested parties and administrative bodies to 
propose a solution to the problem (El Panamá América, 2002).  
While the comarcal leadership struggles to develop more effective institutions and to 
respond to threats posed by development, most Ngöbe communities are on their own as they face 
poverty and localized exploitation.  Grassroots development organizations are attempting to 
address problems on a local level.  These organizations cooperate with each other and with 
churches, schools, and NGOs as they promote sustainable agriculture, the marketing of produce 
and traditional handicrafts, the promotion of women’s rights, access to health care, the 
improvement of irrigation systems, coffee and cocoa production, livestock breeding, community 
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fish ponds, and general economic security at the community level.  Grassroots organizations 
employ traditional knowledge as well as outside ideas and imported technologies.  While they 
appear to be most effective at helping communities address specific needs and at allowing local 
activists and leaders to develop experience in administering development, they are not formal 
political organizations that organize entire communities, nor do they typically focus on 
societywide problems (Miguel Angel Vásquez, interview, August 26, 1998).   
The communal action plans that have reportedly emerged from interviews conducted by 
Proyecto Agroforestal Ngöbe (Ngöbe Agroforestry Project) workers with residents of a number 
of Ngöbe communities discuss a variety of social factors that contribute to low agricultural 
productivity.  They suggest that some Ngöbe people recognize the necessity of protecting 
indigenous knowledge and resolving socioeconomic problems that contribute to its loss and that 
Ngöbe communities are today using ethnic distinctions and political boundaries to restrict access 
to natural resources (see Hérnandez B., 1995).  If the consciousness that underlies the communal 
action plans actually emerges from within Ngöbe communities, it is evidence that some Ngöbe 
people are becoming more aware of connections between local problems and external economic 
and political systems and are attempting to solve socioeconomic problems with them in mind.    
CONCLUSIONS 
The experiences of the Kunas and the Ngöbe suggest that some cultural survival and 
control over homelands may be secured by resisting external control of lands and resource 
management but that integration with the dominant Panamanian society and the world capitalist 
system can undermine cultural survival and ecologically sustainable productive activities.  
Poverty in indigenous communities and environmental degradation in rural Panama are both 
attributable in large part to the imposition of politico-economic institutions, practices, and 
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priorities that have undermined the capacities of indigenous peoples and peasants to meet their 
needs in ecologically sustainable ways.  Conflicts of ecological distribution (Martínez Alier, 
1995) that have emerged with the spread of the world capitalist system reshape both political 
culture and the ecologically significant socioeconomic behaviors of individuals and indigenous 
communities.  While the Kunas have resisted forced assimilation by strategically asserting their 
sovereignty, they have been hard-pressed to manage integration in a way that allows cultural 
survival and ecologically sustainable development.  Their participation in outside economic 
systems, coupled with the gradual disappearance of traditional ecological beliefs and practices, 
has led to unsustainable exploitation of resources.  This, in turn, has led to internal conflict and 
vulnerability to outside control.  The Ngöbe, by retreating to marginal lands, have withdrawn 
from the pressures of assimilation but also lost the capacity to remain engaged in productive 
activities without degrading their fragile resource bases.  This loss has made them poor, and their 
poverty exacerbates their political disorganization and undermines attempts to manage resources 
sustainably.   
Indigenous societies in Panama are successful at maintaining autonomous control over 
development to the extent that they are able to adapt their political practices and institutions to 
shifting external and internal challenges.  The severity of the political challenges facing the 
Kunas and the Ngöbe is determined in large part by the role played by the Panamanian state.  
When the state acts as an aggressive agent for capitalist development, indigenous societies are 
hard-pressed to resist.  Confrontational tactics seem to be most effective, as the Kuna cases and 
several recent incidents involving Ngöbe communities illustrate (see Bocharel, 2000a; 2000b; 
U.S. Department of State, 1997).  Frequent communitywide meetings, societywide gatherings, 
and networking among indigenous governments and organizations are important, as is the 
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avoidance of political infighting.  Also important are the capacities of indigenous leaders to 
maintain the support and confidence of their people and control over economic activities.  
Societies with little associational autonomy are least likely to be successful at these endeavors.   
The Ngöbe case illustrates that associational autonomy can be constructed even under 
adverse conditions.  Resistance to threatening forms of economic development has helped the 
Ngöbe to do this.  In addition, grassroots organization has helped some Ngöbe groups and 
communities to meet their own needs, engage in ecologically sustainable development, and 
influence regional politics and economics despite the inability to organize societywide in defense 
of collective interests.  Nonetheless, the Ngöbe must still, as a society, develop effective political 
institutions and overcome divisions if they are to become capable of asserting control over 
resource management and development.   
Strategic competence, strong leadership, and the maintenance of associational autonomy 
have enabled the Kunas to exert sovereign control over lands and resources and have promoted 
the protection of Kuna rights and cultural survival in the modern context.  Coupled with their 
impressive capacity to organize in defense of collective interests, their relatively intact land base 
and local ecosystems have placed the Kunas in a relatively advantageous position from which to 
address the mounting ecological problems caused by integration into dominant economic and 
political systems.  Many Kunas recognize that the loss of traditional culture and the destruction 
of nature are linked (Wickstrom, 1998) and are working to maintain traditions and educate others 
about the social, political, economic, and ecological risks of depleting natural resources, 
discarding traditional ways, and allowing communities to disintegrate under the pressures of 
outside economic, political, and cultural influences.  While some Kunas are engaged in injurious 
hunting, fishing, and lumbering practices, other Kunas and Kuna organizations are networking 
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with governments and NGOs at the national and international levels and with national and global 
indigenous movements to protect their ecosystems, maintain control over their lands and 
livelihoods, and preserve their culture.  Nonetheless, there appears to be a growing divide 
between conservationist and integrationist Kunas today.  We may be witnessing a gradual 
“deconstruction” of associational autonomy among them.  The Kuna case illustrates that the 
capacity to exert autonomous control and the ability to manage lands and resources sustainably 
are related but distinct endeavors.  Whether the Kunas can enjoy success at both remains to be 
seen. 
                                                          
NOTES 
1. The Ngöbe and Buglé peoples now refer to themselves collectively as the "Ngöbe-Buglé."  (They were once 
collectively known as “Guaymí.”)  While much of what is discussed here likely applies to the Buglé people, the 
research has centered on the experiences of the Ngöbe.   
 
2. The term "traditional" throughout indicates those things now associated with earlier times, before the competition 
for resources and indigenous lands that accompanied white or mestizo settlement intensified for any given culture 
group.  Such competition has always existed, but until colonial domination and assimilation with other culture 
groups became primary pressures, most indigenous cultures dealt with it successfully through long-enduring norms 
and institutions. 
 
3. Reserves were granted before the concept of comarca came into being.  A reserve was a specific geographical 
area recognized as territory occupied by an indigenous group and under the protection of the executive branch of the 
government (Francisco A. Herrera, interview, August 21, 1998).  The term was derived from the North American 
concept of the Indian “reservation” (Herrera, 1998).  Indigenous self-government within a reserve was tolerated only 
to the extent that it did not interfere with state sovereignty or violate constitutional provisions (Herrera, 1998).   
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4. Beginning in 1977, the Torrijos regime entered negotiations with various indigenous groups regarding terms of 
land holding.  It was during these negotiations that the term “comarca” acquired its current meaning.  The present-
day comarca is a “politico-administrative unit wherein indigenous political structures are granted legal recognition 
by the state, which also superimposes politico-administrative structures of the state” on indigenous government 
(Herrera 1998: 13). 
 
5. That is, others who might try to base a claim on long-term habitation or use for time immemorial (i.e., other 
indigenous peoples) cannot claim them. 
 
6. Formerly known as the Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales y Renovables (INRENARE). 
 
7. A point on President Mireya Moscoso’s social agenda, for example, is to “establish social policy toward and with 
indigenous peoples” to help ameliorate poverty in indigenous regions (Presidencia de la República de Panamá, 
2000).   
 
8. Sometimes spelled “Dule.” 
 
9. Kuna Yala is recognized as the official name of the Kunas’ territory today, but, until very recently, it was known 
as San Blas.   
 
10. Wali’s work is the most extensive available source of information on the Madungandí Kunas; there are 
occasional brief references to them in works on the Kunas of Kuna Yala, and a study by Cynthia S. Simmons (1997) 
includes the Madungandí Kunas as a case. 
 
11. For extensive information on Kuna gatherings and their political relevance, see Howe (1986). 
 
12. Howe has produced the most extensive available ethnography of Kuna political culture.  Along with Mac 
Chapin, he is one of the foremost North American experts on Kuna culture, life, and adaptation to change. 
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13. A hectare equals 2.3 acres. 
 
14. For more information on the Madungandí Kuna experience, see Wali (1989; 1993). 
 
15. This estimate probably does not include Ngöbe people living outside the Ngöbe-Buglé comarca. 
 
16. The distinction between de facto and de jure control is one the Kunas use (Atencio López, interview, September 
4, 1998).   
 
17 .The World Conservation Union’s (2000) mission “is to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the 
world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable 
and ecologically sustainable.” 
 
18. “Strategic competence” is a term employed by David Korten (1987).  I use it to describe the competence 
necessary for indigenous organizations or governments to implement strategic political responses as they engage in 
collective action and operate as nonstate organizations in contemporary national and international politics. 
 
19. Although Howe (1998) reports that the organization of Ngöbe gatherings was initially coordinated with help 
from the Kuna leader Estanislao López, Young believes the Ngöbe were already holding these gatherings by the 
time López allegedly helped them (Philip D. Young, personal communication, February 5, 2001). 
 
20. Young indicates, however, that there are still differences within Ngöbe communities regarding whether they 
should oppose mining development altogether or accept it if they can negotiate a share of the profits or jobs for their 
communities. 
 
21. Lands used by Ngöbe people that were left out of the comarca boundaries have been the subject of ongoing 
debates between the Ngöbe and local authorities (cf. Cádiz Franco, 1998; Espinosa, 1998; Vega, 1998). 
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22. A carta orgánica is a comarcal “constitution” negotiated with the national government that specifies the structure 
of governance of the comarca and delineates the extent and nature of both indigenous and state authority exercised 
within it (Howe, 1986). 
